Interdependent preferences in the design of equal-opportunity policies

We study mechanisms to construct equal-opportunity policies for resource allocation. In our model agents enjoy welfare as a function of the effort they expend, and the amount of a socially provided resource they consume. Nevertheless, agents have interdependent allocations. As in the standard approach to equality of opportunity, the aim is to allocate the social resource so that welfare across individuals at the same relative effort level is as equal as possible. We show how pursuing this same aim while assuming that agents have interdependent preferences might crucially alter the results.equality of opportunity, interdependent preferences, social policies, compensation, responsibility.

The proportional rule for multi-issue bankruptcy problems

We investigate how to extend bankruptcy rules to the more general setting in which claims may refer to different issues. We consider two natural procedures and show that, among all bankruptcy rules, the proportional rule is the only one whose extensions according to the two procedures yield the same outcomes.Multi-issue bankruptcy problems, proportional rule, characterization result.

A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules

We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems inspired by the Talmud.bankruptcy, coalitions, claims, Talmud.

Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece- wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. In spite of facing an impossibility result saying that if we allow agents to vote for any piece-wise linear tax method no equilibrium exists, we show that if we limit the domain of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive, an equilibrium does exist. We also show that, for such a domain, a wide variety of methods can be supported in equilibrium. This last result provides rationale for some activities of special interest groups.voting, taxes, majority, single crossing, special interest politics

The Proportional Rule for Multi-Issue Bankruptcy Problems

We investigate how to extend bankruptcy rules to the more general setting in which agents' claims may refer to di erent issues. We consider two natural procedures and show that, among all bankruptcy rules, the proportional rule is the only one whose extensions according to the two procedures yield the same outcomes.Multi-issue bankruptcy problems, proportional rule, characterization result.

The Proportional Rule for Multi-Issue Bankruptcy Problems

We investigate how to extend bankruptcy rules to the more general setting in which agentsÕ claims may refer to different issues. We consider two natural procedures and show that, among all bankruptcy rules, the proportional rule is the only one whose extensions according to the two procedures yield the same outcomes.Multi-issue bankruptcy problems, proportional rule, characterization result

A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules

We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems inspired by the Talmud.bankruptcy, coalitions, claims, Talmud

Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. In spite of facing an impossibility result saying that if we allow agents to vote for any piece-wise linear tax method no equilibrium exists, we show that if we limit the domain of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive, an equilibrium does exist. We also show that, for such a domain, a wide variety of methods can be supported in equilibrium. This last result provides rationale for some activities of special interest groups.voting, taxes, majority, single crossing, special interest politics.

Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies world- wide. We show that if we allow agents to vote for any method within a rich domain of piece-wise linear methods, then a majority voting equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if most voters have income below mean income then each method within the domain can be supported in equilibrium.voting, taxes, majority, single-crossing, Talmud

A new outcome measure for cost-utility analyses of screening programs

We show that, under some plausible assumptions, the gain in QALYs a screening program offers is a positive linear transformation of the program's sensitivity level. This result simplifies considerably the cost-utility analysis of mutually exclusive screening programs.